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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-v-
RICHARD H. NICKLES and 
MARGARET K. NICKLES, 
Defendants-Appellants 
Case No. 18666 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE . 
The appellants, Richard H. Nickles and Margaret K. 
Nickles, appeal from the conviction and judgment of Aggravated 
Arson, a felony in the Second Degree, and Insurance Fraud, a 
felony in the Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellants, Richard H. Nickles and Margaret K. 
Nickles, were tried and convicted of Aggravated Arson, a 
Second Degree Felony, and Insurance Fraud, a Second Degree 
Felony, in a trial from June 7, through June 22, 1982. 
Appellant Richard H. Nickles was sentenced to the indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and 
was fined $10,000 as provided by law for the crime of Aggravated 
Arson. He was sentenced to the indeterminate term of not less than 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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one year nor more than fifteen years and was fined $10,000 
as provided by law for the crime of Insurance Fraud. The 
sentences were to run concurrently. Appellant Margaret K. 
Nickles was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years and was fined 
$5,000 as provided by law for the crime of Aggravated 
Arson. She was sentenced to the indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years as provided by 
law for the crime of Insurance Fraud. The sentences were to 
run concurrently. Her sentences were suspended upon serving 
six months in the Salt Lake County Jail and an indeterminate 
period of probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered 
by the court below or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 30, 1980, at about 1:20 a.m., there was an 
explosion followed by a fire at the home of the appellants, 
Richard and Margaret Nickles (T. 73). The Nickles resided at 
4448 Crest Oak Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
No members of the Nickles family were home at the time. 
Margaret Nickles and the two Nickles daughters, Kimberly and 
Diana, had driven to California on October 27, 1980, to visit 
friends and relatives (T. 1637, 1639, 2005). Richard Nickles 
stayed in Salt Lake City to attend to business (T. 279) and 
then flew to California on the morning of October 29, 1980. 
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His airport parking sticker was marked 10:35 a.m. (T. 1906). 
He flew instead of driving to California because his bad 
back made it painful for him to sit for long periods (T. 278, 
1641-42). Richard Nickles attended business meetings in Los 
Angeles on October 29 and 30 (T. 1638) and then flew to Santa 
Maria, Calfironia, where he was later joined by his family. 
The Nickles made typical preparations prior to their 
departure. A neighbor boy, David Dickert, was asked to care 
for their cat (T. 153). Richard Nickles also offered the 
Dickerts a casserole that Margaret did not want to leave 
in the refrigerator while they were gone (T. Ill). David 
picked it up from the flower box outside the front door (T. 155). 
Many lights were on in the house the evening prior to Richard 
Nickles1 departure (T. 113). 
John Minichino of the local arm of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) called Richard Nickles 
in California to notify him of the fire on the evening of 
October 30 before the rest of the family had arrived in 
Santa Maria (T. 531). Richard Nickles1 immediate response 
was to inquire if anyone had been hurt (T. 511). He also 
expressed anger at the situation (T. 532) . Upon being told 
of the fire, Margaret Nickles1 reaction was tears and 
uncertainty (T. 1782). The experience was devastating to 
the entire family (T. 1654). 
The entire family began the drive back to Salt Lake 
City together the following day (T. 1641). They arrived in 
Salt Lake City on November 2 around 12:30 a.m. (T. 514). The 
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appellants drove directly to their home, briefly examined the 
remains, and then stayed at Diana's condominium for the remainder 
of the night (T. 1643). 
The next day, Sunday, the appellants viewed the premises, 
sifting through the debris of the remains of the fire (T. 1647). 
They located a floor safe which was opened (T. 1647). Secure 
within it were six place settings of sterling silver (T. 1648), 
which were reported to the insurance company (T. 1850) as well 
to the insurance company's attorney (T. 1225). The house was 
open to any passersby and not boarded up for two to three weeks 
(T. 1661) . 
On Monday morning after the fire, November 3, 1980, 
Richard Nickles contacted the appropriate authorities as he had 
been .requested to do (T. 536). 
The State contended that a "device" was found at the 
scene in a downstairs bedroom. This was the bedroom occupied 
by the appellants' daughter, Kim. The device, according to the 
State, was a light bulb in a socket that was wrapped in paper 
and placed in a plastic tray (T. 776). The State theorized that 
the paper was saturated with a liquid accelerant which exploded 
or ignited from the light bulb (T. 811-16). The fire investigators 
found a table with a bulb melted into it (T. 1117). Half of the 
bulb was intact and had paper around it (T. 776) . Kim did have 
a bedside lamp and kept crossword puzzles on her bedside table 
(T. 1614, 1634, 1778). The State further theorized that an 
explosion occurred after the heat had reached a certain level 
from the lamp. All of the State's tests, however, to support 
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this theory were conducted with an accelerant. None were done 
without an accelerant on a light bulb with paper under it 
(T. 1121). When tested under those circumstances, the bulb 
ignited paper in ten to twenty minutes (T. 1123). 
Moreover, no tests were run by the State's witnesses on 
the composition of the plastic material of the table, its 
flammability, or its reaction to acetone or any other liquid 
accelerant (T. 886, 1110, 1123). The melted material found 
at the scene was styrene plastic and was part of a small 
parsons table upon which a lamp was situated prior to the fire 
(T. 1525-26). Battalion Chief John Ungricht testified that he 
saw the remains of something red in the vicinity of where the 
"device" was found (T. 629). At the trial the appellants 
produced a parsons table identical to the one that had been 
located in the downstairs bedroom. A defense expert analyzed 
it and found that it was composed of styrene plastic, identical 
to the melted material in and around the "device" (T. 1525). 
The alleged tray^  was absolutely flat, without evidence of 
° edges or walls (T. 1113-14). 
Independent tests were conducted on the styrene plastic 
material. It was found that it is flammable and burns at about 
210° F. In a test performed at trial, it was shown that acetone 
will soften the plastic table (T. 1861-62). Experts further 
testified that a 100 watt light bulb will reach an exterior 
temperature of 264° to 266° F (T. 1500). A chemist testified 
that, in a test he performed, it took a 100 watt light bulb two 
hours and fifteen minutes to melt through an identical parsons 
table (T. 1501). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A chemist testified that the saturation of acetone mixed 
with the vapors of air must be between 2.9% and 13% for an 
explosion to occur (T. 1884). Any dilution less than 2.9% or 
more than 13% would neither ignite nor explode (T. 990-91, 
1889). The amount of acetone needed to create a 2.9% to 
13% dilution of vaporization, considering the cubic footage 
of the residence and air exchange, would have been a minimum 
of 450 gallons to a maximum of 2,250 gallons (T. 1888). 
There was no evidence that natural gas caused the 
explosion at the Nickles home (T. 552). However, the State's 
own witness from Mountain Fuel testified that swamp gas can 
back up into a house from the U-shaped pipe under a sink 
(T. 425). He further stated that it would take more than a 
day for the water to evaporate from the pipe in order to release 
the gas (T. 428). 
The destruction caused by the fire was virtually total 
(T. 218). The fire was extensive and difficult to repress 
because of recurring hot spots (T. 253-54). The family room 
and kitchen ..suffered heavy damage in the fire (T. 116) . No 
floor remained where the dining room had been, and the walls 
were gone (T. 274-75). In fact, the entire first floor, which 
included the dining room, family room, living room, kitchen, 
and master bedroom, had fallen through, leaving a gaping hole (T. 144). 
The State presented evidence of five points of origin of 
the fire. Chief Ungricht testified that the points of origin were: 
(1) the family room doors; (2) in the master bedroom's bathroom; 
(3) in the center of the downstairs family room; (4) in the 
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downstairs bedroom used by the Nickles1 daughter, Kim; 
and (5) in the downstairs bedroom formerly used by the 
Nickles1 daughter, Diana (T. 633-34). The fire invest-
igators believed that the initial blast was from Kim's 
bedroom (T. 820). The State's witnesses believed that an 
accelerant had been poured both downstairs and upstairs in 
the house (T. 818-19, 822). However, no pour patterns were 
visible downstairs due to the destruction (T. 635) . One of 
the State's witnesses testified that "trailers" of an 
accelerant can be seen after a fire; he stated that if they 
are in a wavy line they do not indicate a pour pattern (T. 631). 
Captain Magana, of the Salt Lake County Fire Department, then 
testified that he only viewed "wavy line" patterns (T. 913). 
The State further contended that acetone was used to 
accelerate the fire. They claimed it was present in the linings 
of three suitcases which were located in the downstairs area 
of the home and in carpet samples. The State theorized that 
the suitcases were used to bring the accelerant into the house 
(T. 382). A fire marshall testified that he had told Richard 
Nickles in July of 1980 that acetone dissipates quickly and 
does not leave a residue (T. 479). Richard Nickles had called 
the fire expert into his business because of a concern that 
a fellow tenant would cause a fire with his chemicals (T. 477-79). 
Acetone was, in fact, present in the sealed cans which contained 
the linings of the suitcases (T. 962). The linings, plastic 
tray, and exterior of the suitcases were intact (T. 1532-35). 
However, tests conducted after the fire demonstrated that acetone 
reacted quickly on the linings of the suitcases which were made 
of an acetate material (T. 1531-32) . The lining itself dissolved 
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when placed in acetone, leaving strands of material (T. 1573). 
Acetone further discolored the linings of the suitcases (T. 1531-
32, 1573). Acetone also dissolved part of the exterior lining 
of the suitcases and the plastic tray contained in the make-up 
bag (T. 1542-43, 1571). In the opinion of a chemist, David Osborne, 
the suitcase lining had never been exposed to acetone (T. 1535) . 
He testified that acetone, caught in bubbles in contact glue, 
could be the source of the acetone found in the lining (T. 1536) . 
The experts further testified that acetone is a component of 
wood that is released when the wood burns (T. 1026, 1539). 
Carpet samples from the Nickles1 home were also analyzed. 
The State's expert testified that this finding was more complex 
than the analysis of the suitcase lining (T. 962). He found 
that there was a simply compounded mixture of hydrocarbons 
(Id.). This indicated the presence of solvents of the same 
type (T. 963). Hydrocarbons are a byproduct of burning wood 
(T. 1043) but, according to this expert, these results were 
not consistent with just burning wood (T. 1045). However, no 
test was conducted actually burning the carpet exhibit (Id.). 
The defense expert testified that he conducted tests which 
found several substances: styrene, toluene, and possibly 
methyl styrene, but no acetone (T. 1541). The toluene found 
would be a normal vapor in a fire and the styrene would exist 
if there were styrene plastics in the home (T. 1542). 
The Nickles home was listed for sale at the time of 
the fire. It was listed from May 15, 1980 to September 19, 1980 
(T. 349) , and again in early October of 1980 (T. 305) . The 
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listing at the time of the fire was for $239,000 (T. 321). 
The real estate agent at the time of the fire, Alice Blair, 
had yet to try to sell the house. The Nickles had declined 
to hold an open house when Margaret's parents visited (T. 328) 
and asked that the house not be shown while they were in Cal-
ifornia (T. 311). 
The Nickles were not destitute at the time of the fire 
despite a $75,000 loan with a six-month balloon (T. 433). 
Margaret Nickles testified to assets of the family besides 
their business (T. 1951). The short-term loan was obtained 
in August of 1980 (T. 432-33) . One payment was made on it 
(T. 438). The loan officer knew that the Nickles intended to 
pay back the loan by the sale of the house (T. 444-45). 
Subsequently, in late October, the Nickles planned to pay off 
the entire loan with new credit they believed they could 
obtain (T. 445-57, 1946). The loan officer was advised of 
this new arrangement (T. 446) . No mortgage payments were 
made by the Nickles after the fire because of a shortage of 
cash flow due to living expenses incurred (T. 1960) . They 
were, however, in constant contact with the loan officer and 
were quite concerned about the situation (T. 452). 
The Nickles had insurance coverage in force on their 
home and on the contents of their home at the time of the fire. 
At Margaret Nickles1 request in January of 1980, the insurance 
coverage had been increased due to the remodeling of the house 
(T. 736). The limits at the time of the fire were $268,000 
on the house with $134,000 on personal property (T. 661). The 
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policy had increased from $250,000 to $268,000 due to a built-
in inflation factor (T. 726) . The Nickles had always maintained 
a "cadillac" insurance policy on their home (T. 716). The policy 
provided coverage for a full year with payment due each September. 
After only a brief lapse because he forgot to pay the bill, Richard 
Nickles submitted the premium due in September of 1980 (T. 1980) . , 
The insurance coverage also included a $3,800 fur rider and a 
$7,280 silver rider (T. 658). 
The statement of proof of loss was submitted to Great 
American Insurance on December 30, 1980 (T. 1208). Although 
Richard Nickles had requested additional time to prepare the 
statement because of the complexity of the information, the 
emotional trauma, the necessity of finding other accommodations 
(T. 1845), and lack of records available to the appellants 
(T. 1850) , the insurance company refused to grant an oral extension 
of time (T. 694). Instead, they indicated that the Nickles would 
have to apply for an extension (T. 695). The proof of loss was 
submitted under difficult and emotionally trying circumstances (T. 1654) 
The appellants did their best to correctly document their 
losses. Only a few receipts could be found where the business 
account had been involved (T. 1930-31). The rest were lost in the 
fire. The appellants were told to utilize replacement costs rather 
than actual cash value on their personal property in the proof of 
loss (T. 723) . The appellants informed the insurance company that 
the column marked "source" on the proof of loss was actually the 
place where they had obtained the replacement costs and not the 
source of purchase (T. 1179, 1849). A witness from Barbara Jensen 
Interiors verified that the Nickles had contacted them (T. 1265). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Several of the businesses, including the art appraiser, admitted 
that they do not keep a record of the telephone calls to ask 
prices (T. 1315, 1361, 1397). The proof of loss was prepared by 
a number people, including family members and friends (T. 252, 
1847). It took two to three weeks of full-time work by Margaret 
Nickles to complete it (T. 1847). The proof of loss was some two 
hundred pages (T. 252), with over 1700 items listed (T. 1167). 
The claim was for $233,350.29 (T. 673). This was in line with 
the bid obtained to replace the structure of $231,192.31 (T. 1911) 
and less than the total coverage. The silver claimed was $12,876 
(T. 676). Because of the manner and means by which it was prepared 
and because of the time constraints, the appellants acknowledged 
that there could, in fact, be errors despite their attempts to 
avoid them (T. 1847). 
One of the major items contained in the proof of loss was 
the claim for silverware. The arson personnel purportedly examined 
the debris shovelful by shovelful looking for silver. Chief 
Ungricht testified that melted silver should have been in the 
remains (T. 548). He further testified that fire personnel were 
very thorough and that it would not be possible to miss more than 
an isolated piece of silverware in the extensive search that was 
performed (T. 1826-27). However, over fifty pieces of silverware 
were subsequently found (T. 1650), together with trays, bowls and 
dishes (T. 1851). 
Numerous witnesses testified not only to the extensive 
remodeling that had been done in the Nickles home. Their neighbor 
had seen sterling silver flatware, bowls, a tea set, and candelabra 
-11-
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within six months of the fire (T. 127-28, 146). She also 
verified that there were new draperies within three months 
of the fire (T. 130). A friend of the Nickles, Lynette Daniel, 
as well as Margaret Nickles described the extensive remodeling 
that had been done in the home. This included new appliances, 
fixtures, and carpeting in the kitchen (T. 243, 1823-24); leveling, 
recarpeting and refurnishing the family room (T. 1825-26); and 
new draperies throughout the home (T. 242, 1826). These furnishings 
were seen by Lynette Daniel the Sunday prior to the Thursday 
fire (T. 260-61). The furnishings in the home were described 
as a "quality decor" and "elegant" by the loan officer on the 
$75,000 loan (T. 469). The draperies were further verified by 
the son of the woman who made them; he hung them in the Nickles1 
residence (T. 1712). Both he and his wife also verified that 
there were two special paintings in the home (T. 1738, 1749-50). 
At trial the State claimed that many of the belongings 
claimed by the Nickles on the proof of loss either did not 
exist or did not exist in the quality claimed by the Nickles. 
These claims centered on the silver, the furs, the paintings, 
designer jeans, and shoes. In fact, much of the silver was 
accounted for (T. 1850) with the exception of six place settings, 
the presence of which is unknown at this time. Chief Ungricht 
belatedly admitted that insurance personnel had found the 
remains of fur and given those to him (T. 2040) . The paintings 
claimed by the Nickles were valued at $4,000 each on the proof 
-12-
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of loss. This was the value only of a copy, not the original 
(T. 1228-29). Several items, such as one of the paintings (T. 1948), 
binoculars, a watch (T. 1864), left a protected area visible to the 
investigators, but the actual item was missing. There was never a 
a claim for designer jeans (T. 1787). Chief Ungricht testified 
that his investigators never counted the remains of the shoes 
that were found (T. 594). Lynette Daniel verified that Kim 
Nickles had about fifty pairs of shoes, Diana about twenty 
pairs, and Margaret about forty pairs (T. 281-82) . 
Subsequent to the judgment, which was entered in 
August 1982, and subsequent to the filing of an appeal, the 
appellants1 case was remanded from this Court to the Third 
Judicial District Court for a supplemental hearing on the issue 
of prosecutorial misconduct. The remand was stipulated to 
by both the appellants and the State. The proceeding occurred 
on April 1 and 7, 1983, before the Honorable James F. Sawaya. 
The trial judge, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, recused himself 
from hearing this supplemental proceeding. The basis for the 
remand and the appellants' subsequent motion for a new trial 
was Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen1s involvement 
with a private arson investigation company at the same time 
1. Judge Leary had presided over a motion to recuse the County 
Attorney's Office and Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen 
specifically in another arson case, State v. Woods, Case No. 
CR82-593, resulting in an order prohibiting Mr. Christensen 
from further prosecuting that case. See order dated November 12, 
1982 in the above-cited case. 
- i ^-
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as he prosecuted arson cases, including the appellants', for 
the County Attorney's office. 
Early in 1981 the private arson firm got under way, 
subsequently incorporating as Arson and Fraud Investigations, 
2 
Inc., (AFI) March 31, 1981 (Supp. T. 40). The incorporators 
were Michael Christensen, his wife Virginia (both attorneys 
with the County Attorney's office then and now), and 
James Ashby, an investigator for the County Attorney's 
office °(Ld.). The filing letter was sent on stationery of 
Mr. Christensen's as a private attorney with Suite C222 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice listed as an address and with 
two telephone numbers, one of which was the old County Attorney's 
number (Supp. T. 39-42). The business was started because 
the County Attorney's arson investigators had been advised that 
their jobs as investigators might terminate in June 1981 
(Supp. T. 43). 
AFI performed eight investigations (Supp. T. 47). In 
March of 1981, they investigated both the Challis, Idaho 
theater fire and a fire in Paul, Idaho. Jim Ashby was contacted 
in both these cases (Supp. T. 49). Mr. Christensen was paid 
for the reports by AFI on these two fire investigations (Supp. 
T. 47-48). The next investigation was in Worland, Wyoming, in 
May or July 1981 (Supp. T. 50). Commercial Union Insurance 
Company hired him for the Worland fire and Mr. Christensen 
2. Citations to the supplemental hearing ordered by this court 
will be cited as Supp. T. . 
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and AFI again received payment for their work (Supp. T. 51). 
Mr. Ashby was again retained on an investigation of a fire in 
Lander, Wyoming. In September 1981, AFI investigated a book 
store fire in Boise, Idaho and a residential fire in Cuna, 
Idaho (Supp. T. 53-54). Also in the fall of 1981 the Farmers 
Home Insurance Company group retained AFI to take photographs 
of fire scenes in Panguitch and Grantsville, Utah (Supp. T. 55-56). 
As a result of the Cuna, Idaho, investigation, Mr. Christensen 
testified as an expert in February of 1982 (Supp. T. 54). Part 
of his qualifying credentials was his experience as a deputy 
county attorney (Supp. T. 54-55). Mr. Ashby, who participated 
in the investigation of the appellants1 case (Supp. T. 76-77) , 
also used his credentials as an investigator for the County 
Attorney's office to obtain work for AFI (Supp. T. 82-83). Once 
AFI's existence was brought to the attention of County Attorney 
Ted Cannon, Mr. Christensen was notified to cease his private 
investigations in May or June of 1981 (Supp. T. 74-75). 
During about a four-year period that overlapped with 
AFI's existence, Mr. Christensen prosecuted about nine arson 
and insurance fraud cases with the County Attorney's Office 
(Supp. T. 20). In 1979, he tried Ray Albert Long. In 1980, 
he tried Edward S. Dronzank. The Nickles were prosecuted in 
June 1982 and John Troy was prosecuted in August 1982. Tracy 
Parkin was prosecuted in January or February 1983. He also 
tried the Busboom case in the latter part of 1981 (Supp. T. 
29-30). At the time of the hearing, the Tony Beck automobile 
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fire case was pending (Supp. T. 30) . A stipulation was entered 
into in the Sargeant and York case that the case would be 
dismissed if they did not pursue their claim against the 
insurance company (Supp. T. 32). 
The General Adjustment Bureau (GAB) was a party to 
several of AFI's investigations as well as to the appellants1 
prosecutions. Glenn Bammerlin of GAB was a witness at the 
preliminary hearing in the appellants1 case (Supp. T. 39). 
Mr. Bammerlin's organization was involved in hiring or 
referring AFI in five of the eight investigations they per-
formed (See Supp. T. 52, 54, 85, 86, 87). 
There was further testimony as well that documented 
a bias in the prosecution. Alva Stroud, an investigator for 
the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute, was involved in a 
meeting on the investigation of the appellant Richard Nickles1 
boat mold fire (Supp. T. 101). According to Charles Webber, 
who had known the Nickles for about twenty years through the 
boat business (Supp. T. 104) and was present at the meeting, 
Mr. Stroud said, "We're out to get Nickles, and I will throw 
his in the slammer." (Supp. T. 106). 
Subsequent to the presentation of evidence at the 
supplemental proceeding, the appellants moved for a new trial 
which was denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICTS. 
The standard of review where the sufficiency of evidence 
is questioned consists of examination of the case in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). Even in reviewing the evidence presented 
in the light most favorable to the conviction rendered, the 
evidence in this case failed to link the arson or insurance 
fraud to the appellants. Reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, 
existed as to: 1) whether the explosion and fire were arson-caused; 
2) if arsonf whether the Nickles were responsible; and 3) regard-
less of the arson issue, whether there was insurance fraud. 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ARSON 
In State v. McCardall, supra at 945, this Court stated 
that it would overturn a juryfs verdict only "when the evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable man could 
not possible have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Such is the case here. The State produced no concrete evidence 
of how the explosion and fire occurred in the Nickles home. 
Their theory was that a bulb wrapped in paper in a tray of 
acetone on a parsons table in Kim's bedroom, with acetone 
strewn throughout the house, caused the destruction and that 
this did not occur for sixteen hours after being set in place. 
The State's own evidence did not support this theory. 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no evidence that the bulb was set up as a 
device. The State's own witness performed a test with a bulb 
and acetone where it was ignited in ten to twenty minutes, not 
sixteen hours later (T. 1123). An expert defense witness 
testified that the bulb would have melted through the table 
on its own in two hours and fifteen minutes (T* 1501) . Thus, 
even if there were no acetone present, there would have been 
a hole through the table if that bulb had been left burning when 
Richard Nickles left the house. 
Defense expert, David Osborne, tested both the so-called 
device, and the table. He found that they were both primarily 
styrene (T. 1525). There was no evidence of another substance 
in the device that would indicate the presence of some type of 
paint tray as theorized by the State. There was also no evidence 
of an accelerant in the device. The so-called tray was completely 
flat on the device without any indication that there were edges 
that would have formed a tray (T. 1113-13). Acetone on the table 
itself would have dissolved the table (T. 1861-62). There was 
simply no evidence that the lamp had been sitting in any type of 
acetone. In fact, there was nothing inconsistent with a bulb 
sitting on a table with crossword puzzles nearby. One of the 
State's own investigators testified that he saw some red material 
nearby in the bedroom that was probably the shade that had 
originally been on the lamp (T. 629). 
Moreover, there was no evidence that acetone was used as 
an accelerant. There was inconsistent testimony on the 
so-called pour patterns with State witnesses saying there 
were trailers in the house and at the same time saying that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the photographs depicted wavy lines which were not evidence 
of trailers (T. 631, 913). No acetone was detected in the 
carpet samples. If acetone had been placed on the parsons 
table, tests demonstrated that it would have dissolved the 
table and there would have been a hole in it. An incredible 
amount of acetone would have been necessary to cause the 
explosion, anywhere from 450 gallons up to 2,250 gallons 
(T. 1888). 
These amounts clearly could not have entered the house 
in the suitcases that the State so carefully preserved, 
believing that they had been the vehicle for bringing acetone 
in the house. First of all, they could not have contained 
the amount that would have been necessary to cause the explosion. 
Secondly, the defense expert testified that acetone not only 
would have discolored the linings of the suitcases but also 
would have dissolved them, leaving mere threads (T. 1531-32, 
1573). If acetone had been on the exterior of the suitcases, 
it would have caused a softening. There was no evidence 
that any of these effects had occurred. Instead, the evidence 
was much more consistent with the theory that the acetone in 
the suitcases was due to a release of the acetone caught in 
bubbles in the glue. 
The cause of the explosion and fire is unknown. It 
is clear that it was not caused as the State theorized; the 
defense experts1 testimony was • unrebutted.. It is possible that 
it was caused by swamp gas backing up into the home and creating 
the explosion. However the blaze was caused, though, there was 
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insufficient proof as a matter of law to indicate that there 
had been an arson. 
B. EVEN IF THE FIRE WAS ARSON, THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE APPELLANTS WERE 
RESPONSIBLE. 
This Court has recently reversed convictions where 
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendants 
had committed the crimes. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983), this Court found the evidence insufficient to 
support a conviction for second degree murder. In Petree, 
the victim was last seen when her mother dropped her off at 
the defendant's home. The only other incriminating evidence 
were statements the defendant made to family members and to 
a girlfriend some two years later. _Id. at 444-45. In 
Petree this Court stated: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
: „ evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
Id. at 444. 
In State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 875 (Utah 1983), this 
Court reversed a conviction in an arson case based upon the 
insufficiency of the evidence. In Linden, black plastic 
cans found at the scene were later traced to Checker Auto 
Parts. The clerk at Checker remembered selling the cans to 
two men, one older and one younger. Although the younger 
was later identified as the codefendant, there was insufficient 
evidence to link the defendant with the sale or the arson. Id. 
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In this case, even if the explosion and fire at the 
Nickles1 home were caused by arson, the State failed to prove 
that the appellants were the persons responsible. No one 
saw anyone set up a device or pour any acetone in the home. 
The State claims that the lights in the house were on prior 
to Richard Nickles1 departure because he was pouring acetone. 
This is total speculation. The only reasonable conclusion is 
that he was packing. The evidence clearly established that 
Richard Nickles did, in fact, fly out of Salt Lake to Los 
Angeles the morning of the 29th of October. It is obvious 
that he would have needed to pack the night before. Moreover, 
the evidence established that Richard Nickles was gone sixteen 
hours prior to the explosion at his home (T. 1906). There 
is no evidence that he had ever purchased large quantities of 
acetone or set up any kind of device. There was, further, no 
evidence presented by the State that any of his actions could 
have caused a fire sixteen hours later. As noted in the 
previous section, under the State's theory of the cause of 
the fire, it would have to have been set much more recently 
than sixteen hours prior to the blaze. 
Moreover, the evidence established that Margaret 
Nickles had left for California on October 27 with her 
daughters. There was no evidence to indicate that she was 
present in Salt Lake City, or in her home, at any time within 
forty-eight hours of the fire. Thus, even if the jury had 
accepted the State's theory that Richard Nickles had set some 
kind of a device, there was absolutely no evidence that 
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Margaret Nickles had any knowledge of it. 
The reaction of the appellants to the news of the fire, 
their anger, their tears, and their devastation, was not the 
reaction of arsonists. Moreover, if the Nickles decided to 
destroy their house because they could not sell it as the State 
theorized, why would they have relisted it as recently as 
early October of 1980? There was every indication that the 
Nickles were anxious to sell and had intended to place their 
home on the market with a new agent. The State further argued 
that the Nickles had a $75,000 loan with a ballon on it and 
were concerned about paying it back. It is true that the 
Nickles, throughout the time before and after the fire, were 
concerned about repaying the debt (T. 452). However, they 
believed that they were going to be able to obtain another 
long-term loan that would repay this one if the house were 
not sold (T. 447, 1946) . They had assets and a business 
to rely upon as well (T. 1951). 
Thus, like State v. Petree, supra, and State v. Linden, 
supra, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the appellants committed the crime of aggravated arson. 
C. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCT THAT 
APPELLANTS COMMITTED INSURANCE FRAUD. 
The mere filing of an insurance claim does not make 
the appellants guilty of insurance fraud. A fraudulent act 
is behavior characterized by fraud. Fraud is defined as 
an act of trickery or deceit, or an act of delusion, or an 
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P.2d 760 (Utah 1977). State v. Galioto, 126 Ariz. 188, 613 
P.2d 853 (1980), provided the same definition of fraud in an 
arson case where the defendant was found guilty of making a 
false insurance claim. Galioto explains that the "gravamen 
of the offense is the accused's intent to defraud." Id. at 
855. The person must act with the specific intent to defraud. 
"[W]hen a specific intent is required to make an act an 
offense, . . . the doing of the act does not raise a presumption 
that it was done with the specific intent." State v. Wittinghill, 
109 Utah 48, 163 P.2d 342 (1945). 
The appellants in this case had adequate, not excessive, 
insurance on their home. While an insurance agent testified 
that the Nickles had always had a "cadillac" insurance policy 
(T. 716), in fact their policy covered actual costs and not 
replacement costs (T. 658) . The amount of insurance covered 
a very elegant home. Margaret Nickles had requested an 
increase after they had completed extensive remodeling of 
the home (T. 736). This increase was effective almost a 
year before the fire. Both the remodeling and the elegant decor 
were verified by friends and family of the Nickles (T. 130, 242-43, 
260-61, 469, 1712, 1738, 1749-50). 
The proof of loss filed indicated no intent to defraud 
the insurance company. The claim which consisted of some 200 
pages and 1700 lines of items was extensive. The appellants 
admitted there might be errors where they completed the claim 
under a great deal of stress without any records and in a very 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
short time (TV 1654, 1347). Whether the Nickles believed they 
were covered for replacement costs or not, they were told by 
an insurance agent to list the replacement costs (T. 723). 
The appellants explained to the insurance company that the 
source listed on the insurance claim was the source of the 
replacement costs and not the source of purchase (T. 1179, 
1849). The State repeatedly tried to prejudice the jury by 
presenting witnesses who testified that the Nickles did not, 
in fact, buy the items at the store. (See testimony of nine 
witnesses, beginning at T. 1251, 1321, 1332, 1336, 1349, 1357, 
1370, 1392, 1489). 
None of the major items questioned by the State support 
a theory of insurance fraud. The State emphasized that the 
sterling silver claimed by the Nickles had not been found in 
the home and, yet, evidence was presented that the Nickles did, 
in fact, have sterling silver flatware and that six place 
settings of it were found safe in a floor vault (T. 127-28, 146, 
1648). Many other pieces of silverware (T. 1650) and bowls and 
trays (T. 1851) were subsequently found. Where these were missed 
by the State's investigators, it is certainly possible that others 
were missed as well. The State further claimed that the Nickles had 
overstated the value of two paintings. However, the Nickles never 
claimed these paintings as originals, which would have been worth 
$40,000, but claimed them as copies which were valued at $4,000 
(T. 1228-29). The existence of the paintings, as well as the 
silver, was verified by several friends and family members (T. 1738, 
1749-50, 127-28, 146). Despite the State's allegations, there were 
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State's investigators failed to count the remains of the shoes 
found and thus raised mere speculation as to whether, in 
fact, the number of shoes was accurate. Further, despite the 
State's allegations that there were no designer jeans in the 
home, there was no claim made for any designer jeans (T. 1787). 
The logical inference regarding the missing items is 
that they were stolen. The protected areas where the binoculars 
and paintings were indicate that they were present when the 
fire occurred. The site was not secured for two to three 
weeks (T. 1661). The destruction was quite complete; any 
thefts prior to or subsequent to the fire would be difficult 
to detect. If the appellants were so anxious to collect 
the insurance money on a fraudulent basis, it does not make 
sense that they would claim items that would be questioned. 
Persons with a criminal intent would not risk detection. The 
honesty, and perhaps errors, of the Nickles indicated innocence, 
not guilt. The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
support a verdict of guilty on the charge of insurance fraud. 
POINT II 
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST IN PROSECUTING APPELLANTS' CASE 
WARRANTS A NEW TRIAL. 
Pursuant to this Court's order, the appellants' case 
was remanded for a supplemental proceeding on the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct. The appellants challenged the propriety 
of prosecution by Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen when 
he was involved with a private arson investigation firm at the 
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same time as decisions in the appellants1 case were made. 
Subsequent to the evidentiary proceeding, the appellants moved 
for a new trial. The court denied the motion for a new trial 
on the basis that it was untimely; the court 
further ruled that it would deny the motion on the merits if 
it reached them. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure §77-35-24(a) provides: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
The rule further requires that a motion for a new trial be filed 
within ten days after imposition of sentence or within such 
further time period as the court sets during the ten-day 
period. Utah Code Ann. §77-35-24(c). 
In this case, the appellants' trial counsel, James R. 
Brown, was not aware of the County Attorney's conflict of 
interest within the ten days of the judgment in the case in 
August 1982. In fact, he was not aware of the situation until 
November 1982 (Supp. T. 14). At that time, the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association had been appointed to represent the appellants 
on appeal. Counsel acted as expeditiously as possible, filing 
both an extraordinary writ and, in the alternative, a motion to 
remand the appeal to the District Court for supplementary eviden-
tiary proceedings. It was the belief of counsel for the appellants 
that a motion for a new trial was both appropriate given the facts 
and necessary in order to preserve a legal issue for appeal. The 
motion was filed within ten days of the supplemental proceeding. 
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Although counsel for the appellants has been unable to find 
any case law that specifically addressed the running of the time 
period for a new trial following a supplemental hearing, the 
statute would be meaningless unless the motion is appropriate 
after such an evidentiary proceeding. This motion could not have 
been raised earlier as the substance was unknown to counsel at 
a prior time. There is no remedy for defendants when this 
situation arises unless the statute is construed as allowing 
a timely motion after a supplemental evidentiary hearing. 
The impropriety in this case had a substantial adverse 
effect on the appellant's right to a fair trial. This Court 
should grant a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor's 
conflict of interest in pursuing the appellants1 case at the 
same time that he operated a private arson investigation firm. 
A prosecutor occupies a special role in our judicial 
system, with a duty not only as an advocate but also as a fair 
and just decision-maker. The Utah Supreme Court recognized 
this duty in Walker v. State, 624, P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981): 
We have previously stated that the State 
while charged with vigorously enforcing 
the laws "has a duty to not only secure 
appropriate convictions, but an even higher 
duty to see that justice is done." In his 
role as the state representative in criminal 
matters, the prosecutor, therefore, must not 
only attempt to win cases, but must see that 
justice is done. Thus, while he should prose-
cute with earnestness and vigor, it is as 
much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one. (footnotes omitted). 
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The California Supreme Court similarly places a 
duty on a prosecutor to be fair and just in his decisions. 
In People v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 561 P.2d 
1164, 1171 (Cal. 1977), the Court stated: 
Nor is the role of the proseuctor in this 
regard simply a specialized version of the 
duty of any attorney not to overstep the 
bounds of permissible advocacy. The prose-
cutor is a public official vested with 
considerable discretionary power to decide 
what crimes are to be charged and how they 
are to be prosecuted. In all his activities, 
his duties are conditioned by the fact that 
he "is the representative not of any ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is 
as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer." (cites omitted). 
Furthermore, Standard 1.1 of the 1971 approved draft 
developed by the American Bar Association for prosecutors 
specifically states: 
A prosecutor should avoid the appearance 
or reality of a conflict of interest with 
respect to his official duties. 
The Utah Legislature has likewise addressed the issue. 
Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4(4) (1953 as amended) states: 
No public officer . . . shall: [a]ccept other 
employment which he might expect would impair 
his independence of judgment in the performance 
of his public duties. 
Where such a conflict arises and is known before trial, 
it is appropriate to recuse the prosecutor. In Contra Costa, 
the court refused to order the trial court to reinstate a 
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prosecutor it had recused where an employee of the prosecutor's 
office was the mother of the victim in a murder case and also 
a witness for the State. More recently and of most pertinence 
to this case, the Third District Court (Leary, J.) ordered 
the same proseuctor as in this case recused in State v. Woods, 
Case No. CR 82-593, under identical circumstances to those 
in this matter. (The order was attached as an exhibit to the 
appellants' motion at the Supplemental Hearing). 
When the duty to be impartial in fact and in appearance 
is violated but not raised until after trial, the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. In Walker v. State, supraf the defendant 
filed a writ and the court granted a new trial where the prosecutor 
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. In that 
case, the prosecutor failed to divulge the fact that a man's 
clothes were in the same room with a female defendant's clothes, 
even though defendant's defense to the distribution charge was 
that the heroin found in that room belonged to another. In State 
v. Bain, 575 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1978), the court held prosecutorial 
misconduct entitled defendant to a new trial where "the prosecutor's 
actions have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial." 
Id. at 922. In that case, the prosecutor continued to try to 
introduce evidence of defendant's parole status even though 
ordered not to be the court. 
In State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) this 
court reversed a conviction on theft by deception and announced 
prosecutorial misconduct would have constituted grounds for a 
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new trial if the convictions had not been reversed on other 
grounds. The appearance of impropriety is also grounds for a new 
trial if the convictions had not been reversed on other grounds. 
The appearance of impropriety is also grounds for a new trial. 
"[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
In State v. Madry, 504 P.2d 1156 (Wash. 1972), the court 
ordered a new trial in an assault case where the defendant 
discovered, subsequent to trial, that the trial-level judges 
had been investigating the hotel he owned for prostitution. 
The court stated that a judge must not only be impartial, 
but must also have the appearance of impartiality. The reason 
is that "[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as 
damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice 
as would be the actual presence of bias or prejudice." _Id. at 
1161. The Madry case is directly analogous here as the ABA 
standards and due process of law require that proseuctors as 
well as judges maintain an appearance of impartiality. 
The actual or apparent impropriety in this case entitled 
the defendants to a new trial. There is no way to know for sure 
what impact the dual positions Mr. Christensen held had on his 
prosecutorial decisions in this case. GAB worked with Mr. 
Christensen on the appellants1 case and simultaneously referred 
business to AFI. Mr. Christensen used his training and position 
with the County Attorneyfs Office as credentials for testifying 
as an expert in court on a case AFI investigated. Where the 
overlap in knowledge and jobs is so great, there is at least 
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an appearance of conflict.6 An actual bias is supported by the 
statement that Mr. Stroud made in the presence of county attorney 
personnel that he wanted Richard Nickles in prison (Supp. T. 106). 
This apparent conflict violated the appellants1 right to a fair 
trial by due process of law pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The appellants have a right to the apparent 
and actual unbiased decisions of the prosecuting agency. The 
"substantial adverse effect" upon the appellants1 right was denial 
of a fair and impartial prosecution and trial. If known prior to 
trial, it is clear that the prosecutor would have been recused as 
3 in State v. Woods, supra. The mere fact that the impropriety was 
only discovered post-trial should not deprive the appellants of a 
remedy. Moreover, the court has a responsibility not only to protect 
the appellants1 right to a fair trial, but also to see that public 
confidence is secure in the impartial administration of justice in 
this state. These two important functions could only have been 
guaranteed if the appellants were granted a new trial in this case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE 
TELEPHONE CALL REPORTED BY EILEEN RICE. 
Over objection of defense counsel, the trial court allowed 
admission of a telephone conversation reportedly made by Richard 
Nickles (T. 864-65) >. Eileen Rice, secretary of ATF, had taken the 
phone call. The caller identified himself as Mr. Nickles. 
3. Prior to the printing of this brief, this Court reversed an arson 
case involving the same deputy county attorney because of his prosec-
utorial misconduct during opening and closing statements. State v. Tro^ 
Case No. 18738 (August 29, 1984). 
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Eileen Rice reported: 
He was asking about some articles that had been 
removed from his home and then mentioned to me 
that there had been a suspected arson at his 
home and that he had been suspect [sic] of it 
and commented that wasn't it lucky he had been 
300 miles away with the Secretary of the 
Department of Energy and that he would have 
needed a very long fuse or a time delay. 
Then, he again came back to the fact that 
these articles were missing and I asked what 
was missing and he said some silverware and 
other things, whole drawers full. And I told 
him I didn't believe we had them and that he 
said possibly they had been removed for safe-
keeping. 
I told him that I didn't think we had them, 
but that I would have John Minichino call 
when he got back to the office. 
(T. 1270-71). 
The trial court allowed admission of the contents of 
the phone call, citing 79 A.L.R. 3d 78 (T. 865)4 and State v. 
Hess, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 90 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970) (T. 864) 
as authority. There is no Utah case law on point. This case 
is distinguishable from State v. Hess and more closely related 
to the factual situation of State v. Marlar, 493 P.2d 1276 
(Idaho 1972). In Hess defendants made a phone call to the owner 
of an Arabian mare named Ingaia. They expressed an interest in 
purchasing her, obtaining descriptions of her which they sub-
sequently used to obtain a duplicate registration certificate. 
They subsequently presented the Registry with a bill of sale 
4. 79 A.L.R. 3d 78 is, of course, a summary of lav/. As discussed, 
infra, the cases require more than identification by the caller 
without voice recognition by the recipient. The circumstances 
surrounding who would have knowledge of the contents of the call 
is to be considered. See §20. 
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containing the forged signature of the rightful owner of Ingaia. 
Defendants then sold another horse purporting to be Ingaia. In 
Hess, the circumstantial evidence surrounding the telephone call 
pointed directly to the defendants and no one else, justifying 
admission of the phone call. They had obtained information which 
they used in the fraudulent sale. The information had not been 
given to anyone else, nor was it a matter of public knowledge. 
It was quite clear in Hess the defendants made use of the 
particular knowledge they had acquired during the telephone 
conversation. 
State v. Marlar, supra, presents a different factual 
situation, more in line with the present case. In Marlar, the 
court admitted an alleged telephone conversation between the 
appellant and the witness Higgins. The caller threatened to 
put Higgins in the morgue. The phone call was admitted over 
counsel's objection to improper authentication. The court 
announced the general rule relating to admission of the 
substance of a phone call: 
The admissibility of telephone conversations 
is governed by the same rules of evidence which 
govern the admission of oral statements made in 
face-to-face conversations, except that the 
party against whom the conversation is sought 
to be used must ordinarily be identified. 29 
Am. Jr. 2d Evid., §380, p. 431 (1967). (Emphasis' 
added). See Tonkin-Clark Realty Co. v. Hedges, 
24 Idaho 304, 133 P. 669 (1913). 
Id. at 1280. The most reliable means of identification is voice 
identification. Id. 
Without voice identification, the general rule is that 
"mere statement of his identity by the caller is insufficient 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proof of the caller's identity." Ld. at 1281, citing Colbert 
v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 136 Tex. 263, 150 S.W. 2d 
771 (Tex. App. 1941); McCormick, Law of Evidence, 405-06 (1954) . 
If only the named caller has knowledge of the conversational -
contents, the phone call may be admissible. Id. Oregon has adopted 
a de minimus rule pertaining to circumstantial identification. 
State v. Glisan, 2 Or. App. 314, 465 P.2d 253 (1970). The court 
in State v. Marlar took a more cautious approach, adopting a 
"clearly corroborative" test regarding the admissibility of a 
phone call. The court considered clear identification of the 
caller, the subject matter of the conversation, and who would 
have knowledge of facts reported in the conversation. 
In this case, Eileen Rice could not identify Richard 
Nickles1 voice, nor did she place the phone call. The Nickles1 
number was published in the phone book. Newspapers and other 
media reported information on the Nickles being out of town at 
the time of the fire, thereby making that fact a matter of public 
knowledge (T. 652) . The contents of the phone call were, therefore, 
not particular knowledge only Richard Nickles would have. Any man 
could have identified himself as Richard Nickles and conveyed the 
same information to Ms. Rice. Where Eileen Rice was unable to 
identify the voice or any particular mannerisms and the contents 
of the phone call were a matter of public knowledge, admission 
of the phone call should have been denied. There was no corroborative 
evidence as in State v.' Marlar, supra, and State v. Hess, supra. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANTS WERE DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
ALLOWING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
A. IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE 
' During the trial, irrelevant or immaterial testimony was 
allowed into evidence over the objection of defense counsel. 
First, a neighbor of the Nickles testified that the Nickles1 
home had lights on in several rooms at 3:00 a.m. on the night prior 
to Richard Nickles1 departure for California. The neighbor saw 
only that lights were on. She saw no movements or any signs of 
activity in the Nickles1 home (T. 112-14). Second, the neighbor 
further testified over objection that she sent her son over to 
the Nickles to obtain a casserole which was offered to her by 
Richard Nickles (T. 114). Third, an insurance agent was allowed 
to testify regarding policy coverage of a family room and a two-
car garage if the home were rebuilt (T. 660) . The Nickles had 
converted their garage into a family room and had no garage on 
5 
the home. No claim for a garage was made in the insurance claim. 
Fourth, although sustaining one objection (T. 1096), the Court 
repeatedly permitted the introduction of testimony regarding 
accelerants other than acetone (T. 1092, 1101). Fifth, the State 
was able to present testimony regarding the proximity of the 
Nickles1 business to Deseret Industries, a thrift store (T. 1690). 
Lastly, the State was permitted to ask Leo Thorup, the building 
5. Although defense counsel did not raise the objection until 
after the witness had answered, we urge the Court to consider 
these objections where there was no subsequent admonishment of 
the jury to disregard inadmissible evidence. 
-TR-
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contractor who prepared a bid for replacement of the Nickles' 
home, if his bid included estimates of building the same home 
in Arizona (T. 1922) . 
Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at 
the time of the trial defined relevant evidence as "evidence 
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the existence 
of any material fact." Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in 
effect at the time of the trial stated that the court had discretion 
to exclude evidence if the "probative value [was] substantially 
outweighed by the risk that its admission [would]...(b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues 
or of misleading the jury..." 
There must be an abuse of discretion to reverse a trial 
court's admission of evidence. Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977). The principles of two Utah cases are 
applicable here, even though each involved the trial court's 
exclusion of evidence. 
In Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 
1977) this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude 
immaterial evidence on weather conditions at the airport which 
was twenty miles from the scene of the plaintiff's fall on an 
icy sidewalk. In so doing, this Court stated "[t]he weather 
report...had very little, if any, probative value and it could 
have created a substantial risk of confusing the issues." Id. 
at 1141. 
More recently, in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982), this Court affirmed the exclusion of possible negligence 
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in Rh antibody testing in a medical malpractice case for harm 
arising from an amniocentesis test. The trial court had 
excluded the information because the Rh sensitivity did not 
cause the injury and any negligence by the doctors in 
diagnosis and treatment of the sensitivity was potentially 
prejudicial to the determination of medical negligence in 
causing the injuries suffered. Id. at 96-97. 
In this case, each admission as well as their cumulative 
effect constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
None of the testimony outlined here was relevant. It was 
presented by the State solely for its prejudicial impact. 
No material fact was advanced by the admission of testimony 
regarding the lights being on in the Nickles1 home the night 
before the fire or the casserole being placed on a flower box 
outside. The State was speculating that Richard Nickles was 
pouring acetone in his home at that time. However, unrefuted 
testimony demonstrated that, if acetone was used, it had to 
have been poured much more recently that twenty-four hours 
before the explosion or there must have been an unbelievable 
amount of the substance in the home (T. 1888-39). 
There were repeated attempts to prejudice the jury's 
view of the Nickles1 motives with irrelevant evidence. There 
was no probative value to either the testimony regarding coverage 
of a two-car garage as well as a family room or the testimony 
whether the rebuilding bid would apply in Arizona. Neither was 
ever raised by the Nickles. Moreover, the evidence of the 
proximity of the business to Deseret Industries served no 
purpose other than to suggest that the Nickles purchased 
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their furniture there. This was total speculation, with 
no redeeming, probative value. 
The irrelevant testimony on accelerants other than 
acetone had only one purpose - to confuse the jury on what 
caused the fire. The State advanced a theory of a device 
coupled with the use of acetone as an accelerant. This theory 
was not viable. The additional evidence of other accelerants 
was designed only to obfuscate the real issue as to whether the 
State had met its burden of proving arson. 
Each time the trial court admitted this type of irrel-
evant evidence, the chances for a fair trial were eliminated. 
At a minimum, the cumulative effect of all of this testimony 
v/arrants a finding of abuse of discretion. 
B. HEARSAY 
Inadmissible hearsay prejudiced the appellants at trial. 
The trial court permitted Jerry Taylor, an expert on explosives, 
to testify to what a County Attorney's office investigator told 
him about the nature of the explosion and fire (T. 1062) . 
The mere statement that an out-of-court declaration is 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted cannot be used 
to circumvent the exclusion of hearsay evidence. In In re Estate 
of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982) this Court held that a state-
ment by the deceased favorable to the interest of her brother 
and made to another brother was inadmissible hearsay Id. at 
1117. 
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Although finding it to be harmless error in that case, the Court 
stated that the testimony that the deceasedfs brother had 
contributed money to buy her household items was offered for 
factual support of the theory that there was an on-going 
fiduciary relationship. The respondent had argued that the 
statement showed a pattern and was not offered for the truth 
of whether it had been given to the deceased. 
In this case, Taylor's testimony regarding investigatorfs 
information on the circumstances and cause of the fire and 
explosion was offered for the truth of the matter. This 
information was the basis for further testing by Taylor 
(T. 1062). Those facts had to be true in order for Taylor's 
subsequent testing to be valid. By allowing the evidence to 
come in as hearsay, defense counsel could not cross-examine the 
accuracy of the basis for Taylor's expert testimony. 
C. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at the 
time required that the witness have personal knowledge of or 
expertise on the subject as a prerequisite to testimony. In 
State v. Jones, 656 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1982) this Court affirmed 
the trial court's exclusion of testimony by a deputy county 
attorney that the crime charged fit the modus operandi of 
someone other than the defendant on the grounds that the attorney 
lacked any personal knowledge of the matter. In State v. Lamorie, 
6. Although the revised Utah Rules of Evidence might allow 
such testimony in as a basis for the expert's opinion, former 
Rule 56 did not. 
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610 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1980), this Court held inadmissible 
Colorado court records of the defendant's prior conviction 
on the grounds that the witness had no personal knowledge of 
the documents. 
In this case, the vice-president of the corporation that 
runs the Carriage House furniture store was allowed to testify 
that the records of the store did not show a particular sale 
to the Nickles (T. 1385)• He had no direct knowledge of the 
records and no foundation was laid for the information to come 
7 in through the business record exception to hearsay. The 
appellants were denied adeuqate confrontation of the evidence 
by this hearsay. 
D. FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE 
Numerous objections were made and overruled at trial 
when witnesses were asked questions which assumed facts not 
in evidence. The general principle that such questions are not 
appropriate has been voiced by both the Wyoming and Oregon 
courts. In DeBaca v. State, 404 P.2d 738 (Wyoming 1965), the 
court found no prejudicial error in allowing such questions in 
that case, but restated the basis precept that it as inappropriate 
to ask a question on direct examination "'which assumes erroneously 
that a material fact in issue has been proved...111 3x1. at 739, 
quoting from 4 Jones, Evidence, p. 1685 (5 ed.). The harm in 
such questions is both that it suggests the answer to the witness 
7. Defense counsel moved to strike the testimony. The trial court 
took the motion under advisement but apparently never ruled. There 
was also no admonishment to the jury. It is clear that this was 
hearsay. 
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and that it may be misleading. State v. Helmick, 423 P.2d 
170, 171 (Oregon 1967). In Helmick, the court criticized the 
trial court for stating there was "nothing wrong" with a 
question which assumed an assault had occurred (in an assault 
with intent to commit rape case), but found no error where 
the witness had previously testified to the actions constituting 
the assault. 
There were six major objections during the Nickles1 trial 
to questions assuming facts not in evidence. Each one alone, 
and in combination, prejudiced the appellants either by suggesting 
an answer or misleading the witness and the jury. 
A question asked of a friend of the Nickles regarding 
acetone being in suitcases was designed only for its prejudicial 
effect. The State asked Lynette Daniels if the Nickles had 
ever spilled acetone in their suitcases (T. 288). At that point, 
there had been no evidence introduced of acetone in any suitcases. 
It was also misleading in that subsequent testimony indicated a 
very small quantity of acetone, possibly from the glue in the 
suitcases (T. 1535-36). 
A question asked about "backup" devices to cause an 
explosion was total specualtion by the prosecutor. The prosecutor 
asked his own expert if he had ever seen incendiary devices that 
had been used as backup devices (T. 1148). Not one shred of 
evidence prior to this point or subsequent was introduced to 
show a backup device. This question clearly was misleading and 
confusing, designed only to speculate where there was no evidence. 
The State questioned a witness regarding what she had 
said to Richard Nickles on the telephone when there was no 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence that he was the caller (T. 1269) . She had merely 
testified that the caller purported to be Richard Nickles 
(T. 1267-68). The prosecutor's assumption that the caller 
was the appellant usurped the jury's function in determining 
that issue and was confusing in allowing a fact to be stated 
by the prosecutor that was not evidence. 
The State was allowed to question a witness from a 
retail furniture store regarding a purchase by the Nickles 
despite the fact that the appellants never claimed to have 
purchased the furniture at the store. Although originally 
sustaining the objection (T. 1375), the trial court subsequently 
permitted a question as to whether the Nickles had purchased a 
dresser from Carriage House (T. 1379). As explained repeatedly 
throughout the trial, the appellants used stores such as the 
Carriage House to obtain replacement costs and were not repre-
senting that they had purchased the item there (T. 1179, 1849). 
The State's sole purpose here was to mislead the jury into 
thinking that the Nickles were deceptive on their insurance 
claim since they had not purchased the dresser at the store 
listed. 
The State then questioned a witness, who had hung 
draperies for the Nickles, as to whether such draperies could 
be modified for a new home (T. 1724). This question assumed 
that the Nickles intended to take the draperies to a new house. 
The State had presented no such evidence. It is clear that the 
prosecutor asked this question in order to suggest to the jury 
that the Nickles had removed the draperies from the house prior 
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to the fire. The State had no such evidence and, yet, was able 
to introduce the idea through innuendo. 
The prosecutor asked a question about a claim on the 
proof of loss of use for a trailer used in Arizona (T. 1765-66). 
The appellants are unable to find such an item in the proof of 
loss of use. The purpose of the prosecutor was undoubtedly to 
suggest that the Nickles had inappropriately claimed relocation 
expenses for their parents in Arizona. There was no such fact 
in evidence and the effect on the jury could only have been 
prejudicial to the Nickles. 
Each of the foregoing questions permitted evidence 
prejudicial to the appellants to be admitted. These were not 
situations, as in State v. Helmickf supra, where the witness 
had already testified to the facts that were then assumed in 
the question under different wording. In each instance, the 
prosecutor used facts never placed into evidence. The goal of 
the prosecutor was attained; he introduced speculation for 
consideration by the jury without any evidence to support such 
allegations. 
E. EVIDENCE BEYOND THE WITNESS1 EXPERTISE 
At three points during the trial, defense counsel objected 
to questions calling for answers outside the witness1 expertise. 
County Attorney investigator Olin Yearby testified about sources of 
ignition (T. 388-89). Aaron Alma Nelson, the attorney for the 
insurance company, testified regarding what the insurance policy 
would cover (T. 1168). Iraj Aalam of Sunglo Energy Systems, Inc., 
called by the defense as an expert in heat loss analysis, was 
forced to answer a question on fuel-air explosions (T. 1609). 
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Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, in 
effect at the time of trial, an expert witness could testify 
in the form of an opinion if the basis for the opinion was 
known to the witness and "within the scope of the special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training" of the witness. 
The purpose of qualifying an expert is to be sure that the 
question will be answered by a person who is qualified to 
answer it. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, §555 
(3d. ed. 1979). The witness must, as Wigmore stated, be fit 
to answer on that point. I<i. This Court, in Park v. Farnsworth, 
622 P.2d 788, 790 (Utah 1980), found the trial court had not 
erred by excluding testimony of a witness called to interpret 
field notes of a survey because he had neither expertise nor 
personal knowledge of the survey. 
The rationale of Park v. Farnsworth applies to this case. 
Olin Yearby was trained in processing crime scenes and had 
received training in arson cases (T. 369) . However, there was 
no foundation as to what training provided him with expertise 
on sources of ignition. By allowing his answer in, the trial 
court erroneously allowed the jury to perceive the witness 
as someone who was fit to conclude that there were no heat 
sources in the house. This same prejudice arose when the attorney 
was permitted to testify as to policy coverage without demonstrating 
personal knowledge or expertise in policy coverage. Although 
perhaps unusual to object to the lack of expertise of a defense 
witness, Mr. Aalam was qualified only in heat loss analysis. 
The State, by its questioning a fuel-air explosion, was trying 
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to restate its case through an inappropriate witness. In 
each instance, the witness was not qualified to answer the 
question asked. The danger of presenting erroneous information 
to the jury was present. The trial court erred in permitting . 
this testimony. 
F. SPECULATION 
It is inappropriate and prejudicial to ask a question 
which calls for a speculative answer. Although the appellants 
have found no cases directly on point, according to Wigmore 
an opinion which is a mere guess is inadmissible because a 
witness must have both the mental power or capacity to acquire 
knowledge in the subject of testimony as well as intelligence 
upon the subject of testimony. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law, §651 (3d. ed. 1979). Thus experience and 
knowledge provide the ground rules for testimony rather than 
speculation and conclusion Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence in effect at the time of the trial embraces this 
concept by requiring the witness to have personal knowledge 
of the subject of the testimony. There were four major times 
during the trial of the appellants where speculative answers 
were admitted over the objection of defense counsel. 
A loan officer was asked whether anything would have 
precluded someone from removing furniture from the house after 
the loan but before the fire (T. 463). This question was clearly 
designed to imply that furniture had in fact been removed when 
there was no such evidence to support the allegation. 
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An explosives expert was asked to speculate whether 
simulated explosion experiments would be more complicated 
by wind coming through a flue in the furnace or fireplace than 
by a broken window (T. 1098) . Here the prosecutor was trying 
to bolster the State's ineffective experiments by conjecture. 
David Osborne, a chemist called by the defense, was 
asked whether someone in the boat business would have acetone 
in a large quantity (T. 1544). There had been no evidence that 
the Nickles had any recent involvement in the boat business. 
The State was attempting to suggest a source for the acetone 
which was without any evidentiary foundation. 
The appellants also objected as speculation to a 
question whether it would be possible to modify the draperies 
in the Nickles1 home to be used in another house as calling for 
a speculative answer (T. 1724). This question was discussed 
infra at 42-43 as it also assumed a fact not in evidence. 
The State was trying to imply that the Nickles had removed the 
draperies prior to the fire without any basis for such an 
allegation. 
The speculative evidence permitted here by itself, but 
especially coupled with the evidence introduced by questions 
assuming facts not in evidence (see infra at 40-43), constitutes 
prejudicial error. The only goal of the prosecutor was to 
introduce facts for which he had no real support. The jury was 
permitted to engage in guesswork with this evidence. Their 
verdict was not based on admissible evidence. 
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G. NON-RESPONSIVE ANSWER 
During the trial, the State's expert, Jerry Taylor, 
volunteered that he had read about flammable liquids in 
general (T. 1099). This response was totally unresponsive to 
the question asked. The witness was asked whether an air 
source such as an open flue would complicate an experiment with 
the so-called "device" any more than a broken window (T. 1098). 
The court had just overruled the defense objection made on the 
grounds of speculation when the witness volunteered that he 
had read about the characteristics of flammable liquids in 
general (T. 1099). 
Although a non-responsive answer may stand if it is 
otherwise competent, People v. Wong Chuey, 117 Cal. 624, 49 
P. 833 (1897), there is great prejudice in irrelevant and 
otherwise inadmissible volunteered statements. The statement 
by the State's expert was gratuitous. It implied an expertise 
on the specific tests and substances in this case from merely 
reading about the general characteristics of flammable liquids. 
The court should have granted the motion to strike. 
H. ARGUMENTATIVE QUESTIONS 
At several points during the trial, the prosecutor 
overstepped the bounds of appropriate questioning by asking 
argumentative questions. The only prupose was to prejudice 
the jury against the appellants. 
Although the appellants have found no Utah cases 
specifically on argumentative questions, the rationale of cases 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
balancing the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its 
probative value would apply here. Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, in effect at the time of the trial, provides that the 
court has discretion to exclude evidence if the prejudicial 
effect outweighs the probative value. In Reiser y. Lohner, supra, 
this Court sustained the trial court's exclusion of possibly 
negligent collateral medical test as irrelevant and potentially 
prejudicial evidence under Rule 45 where it did not affect the 
malpractice claim at issue. The same reasoning applied in Martin v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, where this Court noted the additional 
dangers of confusing or misleading the jury, sustaining the trial 
court's exclusion of weather conditions twenty miles away. 
At one point, a witness was asked whether the insurance 
company's attorney and defense counsel were at the scene of the 
fire as a result of a Motion to Compel Discovery by the appellants. 
The prosecutor had to know the existence of the motion was 
irrelevant. The question was raised purely for its prejudicial 
8 
effect in implying that the appellants were litigious. 
In another instance, a defense witness, who had an 
expertise in air exchange, was questioned about changing 
quantities of acetone and the possibility of fuel-air explosions 
(T. 1609) . The purpose was simply to imply that the witness had 
no expertise. Such an irrelevant line of questioning unfairly 
prejudiced the credibility of this witness. 
The prosecutor next tackled Kim Nickles, the daughter of 
the appellants, asking whether she had thrown her pom-poms over 
8. The witness responded that he did not know. The trial court 
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the neighbors1 fence when it was clear the explosion had carried 
the pom-poms to where they were found (T. 1814) . This bordered 
on badgering the witness. It was clearly designed to attack 
the appellants case in an improper manner. 
The prosecutor also used this technique with his own 
witness. Glenn Bammerlin, an insurance adjuster, was asked 
if he had told the Nickles they could claim items on their 
proof of loss that they had not had in their house (T. 2050) . 
It is obvious that the prosecutor used this question to imply 
that the Nickles had in fact claimed items which they never 
had in their home. This baseless question could serve only to 
prejudice the jury; there was no probative worth to the question. 
Each inadmissible statement, as well as the cumulative 
impact, created reversible error in this case. Although we 
cannot know what evidence the jury considered in reading its 
verdict, the amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted 
in this case cannot be ignored. The jury was bombarded by it. 
The cumulative effect, if not the individual errors, 
warrants a new trial. In Gooden v. State, 617 P. 2d 248., 250 
(Okl. Crim. App. 1980), the court stated: 
When a review of the entire record reveals 
numerous irregularities that tend to pre-
judice the rights of a defendant and where 
an accumulation of errors denies a defendant 
a fair trial, the case will be reversed, even 
though one of the errors, standing alone, would 
not be ample to justify reversal. 
In Gooden, the court reversed where there was prosecutorial 
misconduct in cross-examination and closing argument. 
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The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case 
cannot be quantified. Nevertheless, no juror could have 
ignored all of the inadmissible evidence. Hearsay, irrelevant 
evidence, prejudicial facts not in evidence, speculations, 
opinions outside an expert's area, facts of which witnesses 
had no direct knowledge, and inflammatory argumentative 
questions were erroneously permitted. The appellants are 
entitled to a new trial 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT A CONVICTION ON INSURANCE FRAUD 
NECESSITATED MORE THAN INACCURATE ESTIMATES. 
The appellants requested that the court instruct the 
jury on the definition of an estimate and also that insurance 
fraud involved more than an error in estimation. They submitted 
an instruction which defined "estimate" as "an opinion, a 
rough or approximate calculation of the cost of an item." This 
was given in Instruction No. 19. The appellants also requested, 
however, that the court include, as an element to be proved, that 
on the proof of loss "said submissions were more than 'estimates.'" 
Defendant's proposed Instruction No. 14. The court refused to 
give this part of the instruction and the appellants to ok exception 
to it (T. 2091) . 
This Court has addressed the issue of appropriately 
instructing the jury. In Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Associates, 
Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982), in a civil suit involving 
damages between a lessor and lessee, the Court found no error 
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in the instructions on damages, but noted: 
The purpose of jury instructions is to 
inform the jury of applicable law in terms 
that they can readily understand. 
Id. at 1234. In a criminal context, the Court has reversed where 
the jury instructions impermissibly created the possiblity of 
interpreting a presumption as conclusive. State v. Walton, 
646 P.2d 689 (Utah 1982). 
The possibility of incorrectly interpreting the court's 
instructions occurred in this case by the failure to give the 
requested instruction. The court apparently agreed that the 
distinction between an estimate and insurance fraud was 
significant as it instructed the jury on the definition of 
"estimate." The definition by itself, however, left a void 
as to what the jury should do if they found that any errors in 
the proof of loss were due to estimates. Without the requested 
clarification that insurance fraud required more than mere 
errors in estimation, the jury may well have found the appellants 
guilty without sufficient evidence of criminal conduct. The 
instructions as given, even when taken as a whole, were 
misleading on this issue. Where it cannot be determined whether 
the jury decided the case on an impermissible basis, the Court 
should reverse and order a new trial as in State v. Walton, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants1 convictions should be reversed. The 
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to connect either 
of the appellants to the cause of the fire or to prove an intent 
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to defraud on the insurance claim. The appellants were prejudiced 
by the erroneous admission of the contents of a telephone call 
allegedly made by Mr. Nickles. The lack of an impartial 
prosecutor denied the appellants a fair trial. The multitude 
of evidence erroneously admitted also abrogated the appellants1 
right to a fair trial. And finally, the jury should have been 
instructed on the distinction between inaccurate estimates and 
insurance fraud. For all of these reasons, the resulting 
convictions should be reversed and a new trial should be 
ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /S/ day of September, 1984. 
-LINDA E. CARTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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